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In his first monograph to date, Remo Gramigna wades into the deep waters of Augustine’s theory of 
signs. As G. notes, the literature surrounding A.’s distinction between res and signum has been the 
subject of study for historians, theologians, and philosophers – of both language and semiotics. The 
primary text for most studies of A. on this distinction is his De Doctrina Christiana, with several others 
considering the De Magistro and even fewer the De Dialectica. One of the most significant 
contributions to G.’s study is the incorporation of A.’s treatment of lying (De Mendacio and Contra 
Mendacium) and how these two works on the subject ought to be considered alongside these other 
significant works of A. The author offers as his thesis, “the present work, thus, endorses the trend 
traces by Eco in order to reconsider and explore, from a purely semiotic angle, the fundamental 
structure of the sign and signification in Augustine [...] because certain fundamental concepts of the 
discipline – first and foremost the concept of signum – are explicitly treated in his works” (6). G. 
proceeds to explicate A.’s understanding of sign organized chronologically by the works dedicated to 
this topic. Although G. is quite aware of the wealth of material in other disciplines, this study stays 
close to its intended aim by primarily putting A.’s contributions to the field in conversation with 
contemporary semiotic theory.  
Each chap. begins with a cursory note on the historical setting of the work. Following the 
context, G. engages the secondary literature in semiotics and the work of A. to establish an outline of 
the work under consideration. G. then homes in on the sections of the work which treat signs and 
signification. One of the great strengths of the work are the helpful tables which match A.’s sometimes 
confusing narration of the distinction he makes between similar vocabulary. Although nearly every 
chap. and the conclusion contain helpful tables and charts, the expansive chart at 110–111 most clearly 
evidences the strength of these charts. Additionally, the tables 6 and 7 in the Conclusions section also 
help to map the various vocabulary in A.’s works, noting where it is consistent and inconsistent.  
For want of space, I will limit my comments on each individual chap. to a few of the more 
novel analyses from the respective works of A. As far as originality is concerned, De Dialectica 
contains A.’s only fourfold notion of the relationships under which a sign functions. He distinguishes 
between verbum (“the word that refers to itself”), dicible (“what is understood in the word”), dictio 
(“the unifier of the signifier and signified”), and res (“the external object”) (30). One other point of note 
is that A. recognized that certain words have a “force” beyond mere referent. This emphasis in A. is 
often lost in the philosophical reflections on his work.  





Chap. two turns to the De Magistro. In some respects, the De Magistro is the most lucid 
description of signum and res, but in its clarity, it is also quite simple. To wit, A. makes a simple 
division between only the signum and res without much further elaboration (49). Although the treatise 
moves through various questions and answers with some further clarifications – notably non-verbal 
signs and signs which show – the most profound conclusion of the whole treatise is the rather 
restrictive explanation of how language works. G. summarizes A.’s contention, “[a]lthough this 
conclusion is partially negative [signs don’t teach], failing to envisage that signs have no teaching 
function, Augustine does not disparage the office of words, to which he still grants a limited yet 
important, function” (97). It should be noted that Philip Cary, a scholar absent in this study, takes A. 
at his word that signs do not teach and criticizes A.’s lack of understanding of the utility of words.  
To begin his chap. on De Doctrina Christiana, G. makes clear his awareness of the debates 
surrounding A.’s intention for this treatise. For G., the importance of A.’s work lies in the fact that A. 
was one of the first to consider semiotics rigorously. Contrary to the simplistic notion – signs do not 
teach – from De Magistro, De Doctrina demonstrates A.’s contention that “things are learned by signs.” 
“Augustine, thus, postulates an epistemological relation between the knowledge of things and the 
learning through signs that a subject can experience.” (107) G. does not spend any time reflecting on 
why Augustine changes his mind on this matter, but does note that there is something of a 
contradiction between the two treatises. Augustine gives the classical definition of a sign, specifically, 
“a sign is a thing which causes us to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself makes 
upon the senses” (124). One noteworthy section from this large chap. is the discussion of the frequently 
mistranslated phrase from A. signum datum. Many contemporary writers opt for a form of 
“conventional sign” rather than a more literal “given sign”. G. prefers “given sign” because it is closer 
to the Latin and does not obscure the significant element of will in the phrase (133). There are signum 
naturale which have no will in the part of those who use them. Signum datum, however, relates to the 
will in the user, which is critical for A.’s notion of a sign which comes into play in the two works on 
lying (136).  
G. considers A.’s notion of lying in the fourth chap., a significant addition to the field of 
semiotics. More than just obscurities and ambiguities, the lie constitutes a willful decision on the part 
of the speaker to deceive (144). G. follows A.’s argument through many different subdivisions of lying, 
but A.’s emphasis on habitual lying appeared the most interesting for those more broadly interested 
in Augustinian theology. This is considered in 4.12 – not in 4.13 as indicated in note 4 on p. 146.  
Chap. 5 moves quickly through several other treatises, ranging from Soliloquia to several of 
the works on Genesis to De Trinitate. One worthwhile distinction appears in A.’s consideration of 
Genesis 1. G. notes that A. understand image to be “genetic” while “likeness is mere similitude” (189). 
The concluding section has many helpful charts and notes some of the unique contributions A. offers 
to those who study semiotics (205).  
This reviewer found the volume to be a helpful reference tool even beyond the field of 
semiotics, as it has several pages of helpful elucidation of the divisions of various works and their 
historical background. It seems that this book could be best characterized as a kind of history of 
semiotics, especially the originality and origin of the discipline in the writings of A. Although G. was 
primarily concerned with the areligious field of semiotics, the monograph could have been improved 
by at least considering how sacramentum functions in De Doctrina Christiana and the other places 
where A. considers signs. Certainly sacramentum is a more theological notion, but it fits within the 





very same conversation. Despite this one drawback, the work will be very helpful for scholars of 
Augustine and semiotics more generally. 
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